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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
despondent, : Case No. 890654-CA 
i i 
ROBERT JOHN DEWAAL, Category " " 
Defendant-Appe.._.. : 
BR I ^ RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTILU ^ NATURE JP PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the denial of a motio" in k t I »* 1 J ^ 
guilty i n the Third Judicial District Court, Defendant 
enterec second degree 
felony ; ,^hv ,^\ • i a i. code Ani - 4 u 4 i s up}, i 1 "9 fl 9 ) . 
iurisdictioi t \ ^ CUL the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
defendant's assertion that the sole* issue 
on appeal . - whethe, .iot defendant's j: •] ea wii,1, v« 11 untai 
entered, the issue appeal i i i this case i s whether the trial 
CJOLI'I: i abuse' :i in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
rj rules for a determination 
of this case are pertinent part: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5) and (6). Pleass 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea 
of guilty or no contest, and may not accept 
the plea until the court has found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented 
by counsel, he has knowingly waived his 
right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he had rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to 
a jury trial, and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to 
which he is entering the plea; that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of providing each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the 
plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentence; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of 
a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has 
been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(6) Failure to advise the defendant of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest is not a 
ground for setting the plea aside, but may be 
the ground for extending the time to make a 
motion under Section 77-13-6. 
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Utah Code Ann. % "IJ'-I.J u (Supp, IUIII'I). Withdrawal i 
Pleas 
ii) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn 
at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may 
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is made by motion, and 
shall be made within 30 days after the entry 
of the plea, 
(3) This section does not restrict the 
rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 
65b(:_ ' ~;;?e- r Tivil Procedure. 
STATEMENT otTHE CASE 
O- September *'-'' J'^" ** h 
sodomy : . •• first degree felon} violation ui Jt^ 
Subsequent:s . 
::..irsuar- ; plea bargain, defendant 
the reduced charge of sexual abuse : . . second degree 
i HI ! !. .111 (Yiiin 989) 
--:. March 1986, the Honorable Deai I E, Coi idei , 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
sentenced defend* '" in i hf si. • -
 LeriTl 0 1 o u 
fifteen years * che Utah State Prise 
August defendant moved t withdraw his 
guilty plea b cnndi /ft*- : "«e the 
Honorable Richard - Moffa . Third Judicial District Court 
{H '«<, r«"i;*|. On October J. /, ±JQJ, tne motion was formally denied 
(K, 60-6 1). 
\~KJ 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Robert John DeWaal, was originally charged 
with sodomy on a child, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (Supp. 1989) (R. 24-25). The charge 
arose out of a series of sexual incidents with his seven year old 
grandson (R. 25). Defendant initially was appointed counsel and 
then retained Mr. Con Kostopulos. By the time of his district 
court arraignment, defendant had retained Mr. Bryan McDougal as 
his counsel (R. 7, 19, 26). 
During defendant's preliminary hearing, the victim, 
defendant's grandson, testified on behalf of the state (R. 5, 
25). The case was bound over to district court and a trial date 
set (R. 5, 26). On the day set for trial, defendant entered into 
a plea bargain whereby the original charge of sodomy on a child 
was reduced to a second degree charge of sexual abuse of a child 
in return for defendant's guilty plea (T. 2). 
In anticipation of the plea, a standard plea affidavit 
was prepared and reviewed by defense counsel with defendant (R. 
29-30, T. 3). The affidavit set forth the elements and general 
facts of the crime, the nature and possible penalty for the 
crime, the various constitutional rights which defendant would be 
waiving by entering his plea, the plea agreement, and defendant's 
age and education (R. 29-30). During the plea hearing, the trial 
court inquired of defendant if he had read and understood the 
affidavit and if his attorney had reviewed the affidavit with 
him. Defendant answered affirmatively (T. 3). The court asked 
defendant if he had any questions concerning the affidavit and 
4-
defendant answered HI I I " i . ilii i nm I llli ml il in inn" t i e s 
e x e c u t e t h e a f f i d a v i t , had defendant swear as In t h e a c c u r a c y of 
mi in in in t o r m . i t 11 in nil in mi ana accepted the dftxdavlt for fi l ing with 
the court r J ' . 
In addition, the trial court peisonally made inquiry of 
u l e f e i n Jiiiiiii! ii1 I 11 i l l v« I in n i l mi i \"
 r\\u\ k n o w i n q n a t u r e o f n l s p l e a i T 
2-5). The c u m t explained that, defendant lid'1 )i» ' i1 | ,' 
tria tie informed defendant nlii.nl. before a jury could return J 
v e r d j i I I MIII I 1 ' I Hi in I I I  in II iiiiiii i I iiiiiii in in i iin IIJ'I 1 v a u r e e b e y o n d a 
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t (T \\ Tin LuUiL e x p l a i n e d ( .ha t d c l e i ' i d a i . 1 w.is 
not r e q u i r e d t n t e s t i f y a n d t h a t i f h e d i n n u t t e s t i f y a t m i s 
t r i a l it ni'iuiM iini In h o l d
 ri y r 11 ins I h i i "i nil i Be informed 
d e f e n d a n t t w i c e a s t o t h e p o s s i b l e p e n a l t y (T .', I l | *1 he 
i mil I risked d e f e n d a n t n lit u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e oi t h e p l e a 
bdiyri i i i dJid thd t t h e r e had been ifreep11 'i1 " ' J I * I JIPTJ.III 
t h e c o u r t miqh t impose (T. J ) . He i n q u i r e d of d e f e n d a n t i t aii^ 
A oeen made t n d e f e n d a n t , i f 
d e f e n d a n t was under t h e i n f l u e n c e oi iii uq ,"  i h " IIMI I'I1"1' 
d e f e n d a n t was e n t e r i n g i lie (.il'tvi d h i s f r e e w i l l | i \ 4\ i'n 
I in I I in 1111 HI 11 i 11"" i 11 el end r i i I l i in 11 > i w *»i e <1 1 In m t In r " 11 n d e r s t o o d t h e i i <|h t s 
he was waiving by entering the guilty pied f|"T" ,  | "I'll"1 li i.il 
court specifically found the plea tu be knowingly and voluntarily 
entere : '". "i) 
Subsequently, after a presentence investigate e i 3p . ' 
had been prepared, defendant was sentenced (S i / 4j Prim m 
Xil^ transcripts of the entry of the plea and defendant's 
subsequent sentencing were prepared in one volume, with 
duplicative pagination, Therefore, reference to the plea i -luon 
-q-
imposing sentence, the court asked if there was any reason why 
sentence should not be imposed; defendant's attorney answered 
negatively (S.T. 2). Defendant's attorney informed the court 
that the presentence report did contain some indication that 
defendant was not satisfied with the advice he received from his 
counsel and "if that is in fact the case, then perhaps we ought 
to give Mr. DeWaal a chance to seek additional advice" (S.T. 2). 
The trial court immediately asked defendant if he would like to 
say anything and defendant responded, "I have nothing to say, 
Sir" (S.T. 2). The court then proceeded with sentencing, 
allowing both parties to address the issue (S.T. 3-4). The court 
again asked defendant if he had anything to say. Defendant 
answered, "No, Sir" (T. 4). Agreeing with the recommendation of 
the presentence report that defendant be incarcerated, Judge 
Conder sentenced defendant to the statutory term of one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison (T. 3, 4). No direct 
appeal followed. 
Some three and one-half years later, defendant filed in 
the Third Judicial District Court a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, claiming that the plea was not voluntary and knowing (R. 
38). Hearing was scheduled before Judge Moffat (R. 53, 59). On 
August 25, 1989, after reviewing the transcript of the entry of 
the plea, the memorandum submitted by defendant and considering 
the argument of the parties, the court denied defendant's motion 
(R. 59). On October 17, 1989, a formal order was entered in 
Cont. of the transcript will be as (T.—), and reference to 
the sentencing portion of the transcript will be as (S.T.—). 
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which t h e c o u r t s p e c i t i c a i i y tound thai, I) II n I n n I w • I; 
t h e p l e a was t i m e l y f i l e d
 r and ?) tha t t h r f n i d l c o u r t had 
s u b s t a i i t i a ] ] j comp I j ^ i i - it ii IN ill in n IP" i I i.n t l ie t a k i n g of 
t h e g u i l t y p l e a (R 6(1-61), Tliib a p p e a l iolJowt-jd. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
'i IM 1 I in -i i in i i l l i p r o p y l I \ i i tin i i i i i i MI I ii i mi d e f e n d a n t ' s 
g u i l t y p l e a w»is v o l u n t a r i l y and knowing ly e n t e j u d wliuiu tl i. \ , I 
?fwiHWp' f hi • r i a l c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s and .:ou!d c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e 
t r i a l cou i t s u b s t a n t i a 1 1 ; i 'i nn| i I i < < I I lli 1 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . As sin hi, t h e lower c o u r t u *• -* use i t s 
iiLimrnl • i<j,iiV hiy d e i e n d a n t ' R mo t ion ~~ wi thdraw h i s p l e a . 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY. 
iNii appea l „ I ni. c l a i m s : _ I <•• i i 
n o t v o l u n t a r i l y and k n o w i n g l y e n t e r e d such t h a t t h e lower c o m t 
e r r e d i IL-II) I FUJ II • I • I i Ihdi i i . Lin f "r.i S i n c e Utah 
Ann . § 'I"/- 1 3-6 ( 7 } f a ) (Supp . 1989 | a l l uwb \ p I oa \ 4 \ i m i I I ' . 
Il i I'I i rip wi thdrawn o n l y upon good c a u s e shown and w i t h l e a v e 
ol c o u r t , i rewi jw.iini < <»u,i I i, , I I „ "VPIKI ' -o • t u r t ' F d e n i a l 
of a mot ion in w i t h d r a w a g u i l t y p l e a "only when i t u J e a i l y 
irtppfii I 'i t h e t r i a l cou r t has abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n * 1 in d e t e r m i n i n g 
t h a t no good c a u s e exit*!,1. .• I H V . Vasi ldLupuJuiu, » « !'" ?cl q:", 
93 (Utah {"1 Af»p, ,) | <'i t i n g S t a t e v . M i l d e n h a l l , H I I-" «!<i "i 'L'W 
( I I HI IM in d e n i e d , 165 P . 2d 1?7H (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) . See a l s o 
S t a t e v.. West f 765 P. 2d 8 9 1 , i m {III...I. I'lHH,. 
Further, a defendant is not entitled to withdraw a 
guilty plea as a matter of right. State v. Gallegos,*738 P.2d 
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). Instead, the burden is on a defendant to 
establish good cause for the motion. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 
1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 
124, 378 P.2d 671, 671-672 (Utah 1963)). A defendant must also 
establish on appeal that the* lower court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion. State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 671 (Utah 
1989); State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d at 1301. Here, defendant has 
failed to carry his burden in both instances. 
The heart of defendant's contention is that his plea is 
involuntary because the trial court did not strictly comply with 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting the plea (Br. of App. at 3-4). 
Defendant predicates this claim on the Utah appellate courts' 
holdings in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), and 
2 
State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92. However, in doing so, 
defendant misapplies those cases. 
It is true that the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
"[t]here is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the 
record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge against him,M State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (quoting McCarty v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459, 466 (1969), superseded by rule, 857 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 
1988)). Because of this, as a general rule, judges may not rely 
2 
Defendant also relies on State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The decision in Valencia did nothing more than 
apply Gibbons and Vasilacopulous where the record was virtually 
devoid of any inquiry of the defendant as to the voluntary and 
knowing nature of his plea. IcL at 1334. 
solely on defense counsel or affidavits to ensure a defendant's 
understanding of his rights. Id. However, an affidavit may be 
used as a starting point for the judge in determining the 
defendant's understanding of his rights or the nature of any plea 
negotiations. Id. Accord Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1038 
(Utah 1989). Here, the trial court utilized the affidavit in 
questioning defendant but did not exclusively rely on it to 
determine defendant's understanding. 
More importantly, the Utah appellate courts have 
refused to apply Gibbons and Vasilacopulos retroactively. 
Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (1989); State v. 
Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672. Rather, a pre-Gibbons plea must be 
reviewed under the "totality of the record" standard of State v. 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986), Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
310, 311 (Utah 1985), and Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 
3 
1985). Jd. Applying that standard to defendant's plea, it is 
clear that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the trial court substantially complied with Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11. 
The "totality of the record" establishes that defendant 
in his preliminary hearing heard the testimony of the victim as 
3 
While Hickman makes explicit that pre-Gibbons pleas are 
governed by the "totality of the record" test, the state does not 
concede that post-Gibbons pleas are subject to a strict 
complaince standard. Rather, recent Utah Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting Gibbons make clear by their holdings that strict 
complaince with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 is not absolutely required 
where a plea is otherwise determined to be voluntary. See 
Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-19; State v. Copeland, 
765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988). Accord State v. Thurston, 781 
P.2d at 1301. In any case, this issue need not be decided in 
this case where the plea is a pre-Gibbons plea. 
to what sexual incidents were being alleged. In preparation of 
the entry of the plea, defendant's counsel prepared and explained 
to him an affidavit, which fully set forth the nature, elements 
and penalty for the crime as well as the constitutional rights 
defendant would be waiving in entering his plea. In court, 
defendant represented that he fully understood the affidavit. 
The court then personally inquired of defendant as to his 
understanding of the consequences of the guilty plea. 
Specifically, the court questioned defendant as to his 
understanding of his right against compulsory self-incrimination 
and to a jury trial (T. 4). Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(c). The 
court explained the penalty involved and that the court was not 
bound by any agreement as to the sentence (T. 2, 3-4). Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(5)(e). The parameters of the plea bargain were 
discussed (T. 2-4). Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(f). While the court 
did not directly discuss with defendant the elements of the crime 
or that the state had the burden of proof, the affidavit executed 
by defendant set forth in detail these aspects (R. 29-30). Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11(5)(d). Even though the court did not explicitly 
state the state's burden of proof, the court did explain to 
defendant that if he had a trial, he could not be convicted 
unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was 
guilty of the crime (T. 4). Based on the inquiries and 
affidavit, the trial court found the plea to be voluntarily and 
4 
knowingly entered (T. 5). Utah R. Crim. P. 11(b). 
4 
The court did not advise defendant as to any time limits for 
filing a motion to withdraw as directed by Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(5)(g). However, this provision is not mandatory. Utah R. 
•10-
There is no basis in the record from which to conclude 
that the plea was not voluntarily entered. As such, £he lower 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, correctly concluding that the trial 
court had substantially complied with Rule 11. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm the lower court's denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and affirm defendant's 
conviction for sexual abuse of a child. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this *3<D day of March, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Mark A. Besendorfer, Attorney for Appellant, 7355 South 9th 
East, Midvale, Utah 84107, this X3Q day of March, 1990. 
Cont. Crim. P. 11(6). Further, at the time of the plea, 
subsection 5(g) had not been included in the rule; there were no 
time limits for the filing of a motion to withdraw. Despite the 
amended time limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 
1989), this is why, undoubtedly, the lower court found that 
defendant had timely filed his motion to withdraw his plea (R.60-
61). 
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